

Para 1 of this is a CRP

Eliminate first 1/2 of Para as  
extraneous material [during-----] The new  
— Not a CRP. That is to set the <sup>exempt</sup> stage.

Has the "category" criteria in former  
12065 section 1-301 been eliminated

— NO

Para 2

① Is this statement correct?

— Unclear what statement is meant.

All associates of CIA are bound to  
secrecy... What if no secrecy oath was  
signed? Doesn't matter.

② written or oral publication

written publication or oral presentation  
— Changed

③ if writer gives a <sup>manuscript</sup> ~~publication~~ to a publisher  
or employer person  
CRD won't renew it ??

— It will be reviewed but the

author may not be given approval.

Para 5

a) credibility of author --- will remain as  
he provided with a bio sketch of author?  
— We hope so.

This para say people will pay more attention  
to Turner than they will to an "indian"  
From this I surmise that we can release  
more for a junior employee than a senior  
— Yes

e) This para is a NO NO

① We are attempting to HDS/AC information even  
though manuscript under review is releasable  
?

② How can we withhold releasable info  
on the grounds that someone may ask for  
additional cleared material on same subject  
?

1. Material can only be held if causes damage  
to National Security

2 FOIA - individuals has right to request

## GUIDELINES FOR THE PREPUBLICATION

## REVIEW OF MANUSCRIPTS

During recent years CIA has been under considerable outside pressures and executive order requirements to release to the public as much information as possible. We have tried diligently, even to a fault, to respond including in review of manuscripts. The result has been that a considerable volume of information has reached the public domain including a sobering amount that has caused damage to the Agency. Some damage has been immediate and obvious, other has been insidious and ~~gradually accumulating into an~~ *its full impact on the Agency will never be known.* ~~even more significant mass.~~ We must stop this. We must ~~understand~~ *follow* the underlying intent of the new executive order and more strictly ~~refine our~~ *actions to be as* ~~its orders and do so in the~~ *as* most consistent ~~way~~ possible. The new executive order states that information which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security is classified; that the identification of a confidential foreign source or information relating to intelligence sources or methods is presumed to cause damage to the national security; that when there is reasonable doubt about the need to classify information it shall be ~~classified~~ considered classified; and that information shall be classified for as long as required by national security considerations.

These guidelines are for use on material related to intelligence matters written by persons who are, or have been employed or associated with the CIA. Primarily, this will be current and former employees but will include persons on contract to CIA, or persons who have or have had access to CIA material by reason of association via service in private or other governmental organizations such as companies doing consulting for CIA, employees of the Department of Justice, or with a congressional staff, etc. All such persons ~~have~~ *will* have held a ~~position~~ position of trust with the U.S. government and, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, they must fulfill that trust by clearing any material relating to intelligence matters before it is published. The material may be for written or oral publication. Only completed manuscripts will be accepted for review and then only when they have not been given to a publisher or any other improper person.

The reviewer is responsible for balancing the protection of information on national security grounds against the value of release to the public

knowledge. The only information to be judged is that which was learned as a result of employment or association with the CIA or is information which belongs to the CIA. When a person has spent a significant period employed at CIA it is presumed that all information relating to intelligence matters was learned as a result of that employment unless it is sourced otherwise. For those associated with <sup>CIA</sup> ~~ICA~~ in other capacities, a similar presumption must be made commensurate with the length and intimacy of the CIA association. Where such information is sourced outside CIA the sourcing must be clear and ~~xx~~ is the responsibility of the author.

Decisions to delete information will be based ~~xxx~~ solely on the judgment whether release reasonably could be expected to ~~cause~~ damage to the national security as defined in the current executive order. These decisions may be subject to legal review but will stand unless there is serious potential for establishing a long-term damaging precedent. Reviewers also must adhere to the policy, also established by the executive order, that information may not be withheld to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person or agency; or to prevent or delay release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.

The following points should be kept in mind during manuscript review. They are intended to serve as the basis for arriving at consistent classification judgments. When you decide to withhold, that decision should be supportable under the "reasonable man" rule. The considerations are as follows:

a. Determine the credibility of the author. It will be based on his agency experience, position/s/, stature, and notoriety. A former director has a very high credibility rating which gives greater weight to his words and to the damage they could do.

b. General statements may be unclassified when more specific statements will not be. A statement, for example, that CIA operates abroad is not classified; a statement that  is classified. **STAT**

As a rule, when you can determine to a reasonable degree that release of the information would materially contribute to the identification of a clearly discernible aspect of CIA's activities, sources, or methods, that information should be withheld.

- c. Factual or non-fictional writing about secret work must be carefully screened. Biographical or autobiographical accounts of persons who have been involved in secret work with CIA normally will be withheld in toto. When factual accounts of secret work in CIA appear in ~~works~~ fictional writing they normally will be withheld even if names have been changed. The question is whether ~~there~~ there is sufficient detail to identify the actual events.
- d. These guidelines should be used on information originated during WWII up to the present day.
- e. Consider who or what could be damaged by release of the information. It could be a foreign liaison service, other Agency personnel, the identity of a cover, the location of a CIA facility, etc. When you determine that such could be damaged, withhold.
- e. Consider whether release could lead to additional demands for information or could contribute to the aggregate that would acquire sensitivity.
- f. Once an item has been withheld, watch for references to it, sometimes using other language, and be as consistent as possible on that item.

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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

20 Jan 82

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,  
building, Agency/Post)

Initials

Date

1. ADMIN *TH* 20 Jan 82
2. Dick *a*
3. Tom *✓*
4. Ange *X*
5. Mark *X*

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

Comments ?

Need ASAP

✓ Examples of damage to CIA (line 6)

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,  
clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

*Stan K*

Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)

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FORM 41 (CFR) 101-11.206

<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE
TO: <i>Don</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: <i>Here is Admin Branch's comments.  That is all now, Stan K.</i>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)